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vs 
JOHN E. COFFER, 
Defendant/Petitioner 
Case No. 88-0379 CA 
Priority 14 b 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant seeks review of the Decree of Divorce signed in the 
Eighth District court on 25 April, 1988, by the Honorable Dennis 
L. Draney. Notice of Appeal was filed on the 25th day of May, 
1988, in the Eighth District Court, Duchesne County State of 
Utah. Section 78-2a-3 (2)(g) of the Utah Code confers jurisdic-
tion on the Court of Appeals to review Divorce Decrees. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether it was error to award a portion of retirement bene-
fits, received as a result of a disability, to Respondent in this 
case. 
Whether it was error to award alimony where the testimony of 
the Respondnet indicates that the Respondent has worked in the 
past, and where Respondent was awarded property sufficient for her 
personal maintenance while she seeks employment. 
Whether it was error to require that Petitioner maintain 
Respondent as a beneficiary on his life insurance policy as 
further alimony. 
Whether it is equitable to order the Petitioner to cash-out 
the amount due Respondent from his retirement fund in the event 
the Teamster's will not pay it directly to Respondent when the 
Petitioner has no means of obtaining such a large sum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On the 19th day of January, 1988, the divorce trial in the 
matter of Wanda Lucile Coffer vs. John E. Coffer was held in the 
Eighth Judicial district Court in and for Duchesne County, State 
of Utah. On April 25th, 1988, the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, 
Judge of the Eighth District Court signed a final judgment and 
decree in this matter dividing the property of the parties and 
ordering Defendant to pay alimony. 
Defendant appeals those portions of the final decree which in 
paragraph 2 orders Defendant to pay a portion of his pension to 
Plaintiff and to pay it in a lump sum cash-out if the pension fund 
will not pay directly to Plaintiff; in paragraph 3 orders 
Defendant to pay $200.00 per month alimony and in paragraph 5 
orders Defendant to maintain Plaintiff as a beneficiary on his 
life insurance policy. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the trial of this matter before the District Court 
testimony revealed the following facts: 
a) That Defendant had two heart attacks and open heart 
surgery and therefore could not continue working. 
(Record, p. 240) 
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b) That Defendant is receiving retirement benefits from the 
Teamster's Pension Fund in the amount of $650,00 per month 
until July, 1989 at which time the benefits will be reduced 
to $350.00. (Record, p. 241) 
c) Defendant receives $507.00 per month in Social Security 
benefits. (Record, p.153) 
d) Defendant has no other income and no means of obtaining 
any other income. (Record, p. 241) 
e) That Defendant is receiving his retirement benefits 
ear1ier than he otherwise would have done because of a 
disability. Defendant had a heart attack and heart surgery 
which made it impossible for him to continue working. 
(Record, pp. 240, 241) 
f) That Plaintiff has little or no ability to produce an 
income or support herself in the way of investments of job 
skills. (Record, p. 154) 
g) That Plaintiff had worked at several occupations prior 
to marrying Defendant. (Record, p. 198) 
h) That Defendant has a life insurance policy. 
(Record, p. 155) 
In the divorce decree Plaintiff was awarded a three bedroom 
house, a car and an R.V. worth $15,000.00, as well as approxi-
mately $5,000.00 cash from a Money Market account. (Record, pp. 
161 , 158, 157, 186.) 
The decree also ordered Defendant to pay Plaintiff 26.5% of 
the amount of the pension which is one half of the retirement 
earned during the marriage and to cash-out Defendant's share of 
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the retirement fund if direct payments from the pension fund 
cannot be arranged. (Record, p. 161) 
The decree ordered the Defendant to pay Plaintiff $200.00 per 
month as alimony. (Record, p. 161) 
The decree further ordered Defendant to maintain Plaintiff as 
a beneficiary on an insurance policy on his life of $5,000.00 as 
further alimony. (Record, p. 161) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's testimony before the District Court indicates 
that a disabling heart attack forced him to retire early. The 
case law indicates that a pension received as a result of a 
disability is not subject to equitable distribution upon divorce, 
but should be the personal property of the disabled party. 
Further, ordering the Defendant to cash-out this amount places an 
undue burden on Defendant. 
Alimony should be temporary in nature lasting long enough to 
assist Plaintiff in regaining financial stability, but not perma-
nent as if it were a pension. Further, where the facts show that 
the Defendant's sole income will be reduced on a date certain, it 
is only equitable to reduce any alimony obligation in equal 
proportion. 
Ordering Defendant to maintain Plaintiff as beneficiary on 
his life insurance policy as further alimony is tantamount to 
requiring Defendant to pay alimony even when he is deceased and 
interferes with his right to contract freely and creates a long 
lasting financial entanglement of the parties which the Court 
expressly seeks to avoid. 
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ARGUMENT 
Appellant was forced to retire early due to a disability* 
T h e pension he received at that point should be considered his 
p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y b e c a u s e as R e s p o n d e n t ' s c o u n s e l c o n c e d e d at 
trial "the law says if it is a disability it's not dividable." 
Respondent testified at trial that he had his first heart attack 
in 1980. That he had another heart attack six months later and 
subsequently had open heart surgery and by-passes. His testimony 
further indicated that after his heart attack he could not pass a 
2 
physical and had no choice but to take his disability pension. 
M r . Coffer also testified that he has a Social Security disa-
3 
b i l i t y certificate and that he got Social Security early on the 
4 
grounds of disability. Respondent's testimony at Trial corrobo-
rates Petitioner's testimony on this issue. She testified that he 
5 
had had heart attacks and open heart surgeries and that he was 
forced to retire after his open heart surgery. When asked "He was 
d i s a b l e d and therefore given a pension, is that correct?" She 
6 
answered "yes." 
T h e Case law indicates that a disability pension should not 
7 
be considered a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. 
The Teamster's Union provided Petitioner with a disability 
p e n s i o n in an attempt to make him whole again. Such a pension is 
d e s i g n e d to compensate an employee for a loss of earning power. 
As s u c h , it is personal to the employee and is distinguishable 
from a retirement pension. The disabled worker, in effect, has 
traded his good health, which he had before he was married, for a 
disability pension. As such, it is personal to the employee and 
1 Record, p. 254 5 Record, p. 187 
2
 Record, p. 240 6 Record, p. 197 
3 Record, p. 243 7 Freeman v. Freeman, 468 S. 2d 326 
4 Record, p. 241 (FLA Ct. of Appeals, 1985) 
is distinguishable from a retirement pension and should not be 
3 
considered a marital asset subiect to equitable distribution. 
During the marriage, disability payments, which replace lost 
earning capacity, might be considered a marital asset. A divorced 
spouse, however, should have no more right to a share of dis-
ability payments payments received after dissolution of the 
marriage than she would have a right to a portion of her divorced 
9 
spouse's income which he earned after the divorce. 
Testimony further shows that Mr. Coffer's Teamster's Pension 
will be reduced by $300.00 per month beginning in July 1989. Mr. 
Coffer's pension and Social Security benefits are the only income 
he will ever have. 
Petitioner lacks the financial resources to cash-out any 
amount due to Respondent. Furthermore, such a sum would be purely 
speculation based on an assumption that Petitioner who has already 
suffered two heart attacks will continue to live a certain period 
of time. Therefore, it would be inequitable to make Petitioner 
cash-out his pension. 
It was an abuse of the discretion of the Trial Court to order 
permanent alimony in this case and to order Petitioner to maintain 
Respondent as a beneficiary on his life insurance as further 
alimony . 
Factors to be considered in determining alimony include: 
1. The financial conditions and need of the wife. 
2. The ability of the wife to produce sufficient income for 
herself. 
10 
3. The ability of the husband to provide support. 
8 Freeman v. Freeman, 468 S.2d 326 (FLA. 1985); Griggs v. Griggs, 
686 P.2d 68 (ID, 1984); County Attorney, Pima County v. Kaplan, 
650 P.2d 912 (AZ. 1980) 
9 Dickman v. Dickman, 606 P.2d 909 (AZ. App. 1980) 
Respondent was awarded, in the decree, a furnished frame 
house with garage and the real estate beneath the buildings. 
Respondent was also awarded personal property including a 1979 
Lincoln Continental Town Coupe, one half of a $10,000.00 Money 
Market Certificate as well as a motor home valued at $15,000.00. 
Under these circumstances Respondent would not appear to be needv 
or in danger of becoming a ward of the State. 
Respondent's testimony before the Trial Court below indicates 
that she has the ability to produce sufficient income for herself. 
She stated that she had worked in a bank as a bookkeeper, for a 
trucking company as a secretary, and as a dispatcher, that she had 
acted as an owner, manager of a Dude Ranch and that she has a high 
1 1 
school diploma. She further testified that she has no minor 
12 
children living at home for whom she must provide care. She also 
13 
works as a waitress at the Hanna Bar. Respondent has not looked 
14 
for other employment. Respondent is an able-bodied woman in her 
mid-fifties; there is no testimony before the Court that she is 
ill or unable to work. 
In Dakin v. Dakin, 384 P.2d 639 (WA, 1963) the Supreme Court 
of Washington noted that it was the policy of that State to place 
a duty upon the wife to gain employment if possible, quote " 
alimony is not a matter of right. When the wife has the ability 
to earn a living, it is not the policy of the law of this State to 
give her a nernetual lien on her divorced husband' s future 
income." Morgan v ^ M o r g a n , 369 P.2d 516 (WA, 1962). "We think 
that she should be encouraged to rehabilitate herself in that, 
within a reasonalbe period, she mav become self-supporting." J^ llSlil 
11 Record, pp. 198, 199 
12 Record, p. 197 
13 Record, p. 182 
14 Record, p. 196 - 7 -
v. Dakin, S u p r a• 
In the Dakin v. Dakin case the wife was fifty-four years old 
without any specific trade or profession and without minor 
children. Similarly Respondent in this case should seek employment 
and retraining if necessary rather than attempt to depend on pay-
ments from Petitioner whose ability to provide support: is perma-
nently limited and, in fact, will decrease by $300.00 per month as 
of July, 1989 and who, considering his history of heart attacks 
and heart surgery cannot reasonably be expected to live for any 
time certain. 
Since Petitioner's ability to provide support will signifi-
cantly diminished as of July, 1989, it would be an abuse of 
discretion to not also proportionately reduce Petitioner's 
obligation to provide support at the very least. 
I n
 Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987) the Court 
upheld a lower Court's refusal to award alimony where the evidence 
below indicated the husband, who was a lawyer, had lost his major 
client. His practice had diminished and he anticipated a 
continued reduction of his salary for these reasons. In this case 
the Court had failed to award the wife alimony even where her 
testimony indicated she had an asthma condition which she thought 
had an adverse effect on her ability to be employed. A similar 
result should have been achieved in Petitioner's case: that is 
where Respondent is an able bodied woman; who has been employed in 
the past and where Petitioner's ability to provide support is 
permanently limited and will soon be significantly reduced. 
Respondent, who received ample property in the divorce decree 
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should not have been awarded alimony. 
F u r t h e r , o r d e r i n g P e t i t i o n e r to m a i n t a i n R e s p o n d e n t as a 
beneficiary of his life insurance as further alimony was a clear 
a b u s e of the d i s c r e t i o n of the T r i a l C o u r t . Such an order is 
tantamount to requiring Petitioner to pay alimony even after he is 
deceased and interferes with his right to contract freely, or at 
least adds restrictions to a life insurance contract not original-
ly contemplated by the parties. Surely Petitioner's duty, if any, 
to support his ex-wife does not continue after he is dead. This 
provision also creates a long lasting financial entanglement of 
the parties which the Court expressly sought to avoid. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner suffered disabling heart attacks which prevented 
him from continuing his employment as a Teamster. As a result, 
P e t i t i o n e r r e c e i v e s a small p e n s i o n w h i c h w i l l be reduced by 
almost one-half as of July, 1989. To determine a cash-out value 
of his pension based on his uncertain future would be inequitable 
and would clearly place an undue burden on Petitioner who has no 
other source of income than his pension and his disability payment 
from the Social Security Administration. 
It was an abuse of discretion for the Court to order perma-
nent alimony in this case where the Respondent is an able-bodied 
woman able to seek employment. She has received a generous pro-
perty settlement and , where due to Petitioner's uncertain life 
expectancy, Respondent would be more likely to become a charge on 
the State should she fail to seek employment and should Petitioner 
d i e and be u n a b l e to c o n t i n u e p a y i n g a l i m o n y . P e t i t i o n e r ' s 
- 9 -
obligation to pay alimony should have been ordered reduced. 
Further, ordering Petitioner to maintain Respondent as the 
beneficiary on his life insurance policy would be an abuse of 
discretion by requiring Petitioner to continue paying alimony when 
he is no longer alive. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that the court 
overrule the Trial Court's order that Petitioner pay any amount of 
his pension to Respondent; that the Court overrule the Trial 
Court's order that Petitioner pay permanent alimony to Respondent 
or in the alternative order the Trial Court to consider whether 
the alimony payment should cease or at least be reduce when 
Petitioner's pension payment is reduced on July 1, 1989 and that 
the Court overrule the Trial Court's order that Petitioner must 
maintain Respondent as a beneficiary on his life insurance policy 
as further alimony. 
DATED- this / £ - day of /fa* CCc 
_/Z^±_^^r2^/_. , 1989. 
)lXCm D. HINDL 
Attorney for Petition 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
true and correct copy 
prepaid, U.S. Mail to: 
Machelle Fitzgerald 
Attorney for Respondent 
156 North 200 East 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
I hereby certify on this / ^ f day of (j^H^aat^ , 1989, a 
of the foregoing APPEAL w< led, postage 
\ * / s- k^  ^ 
ADDENDUM 
lj ROLAND URESK (3307) 
JMACHELLE FITZGERALD (1037) 
jAttorneys for /Ma in tiff 
I Z i o-ns Bank Building 
156 North 200 Fast 
Hooscvnl t , Ut ah 84000 
(801) 722-4008 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WANDA LUC ILK COFFER, 
P 1 a i n t i f f , 
vs . 
JOHN IE E D W A R D C O F F E R , 
D e f e n d a n t . 
D E C R E E OF D I V O R C E 
) Civil No. 8 7 - C v - l D l - D 
C O N C L U S I O N S OF LAW 
The above ent it 1ed matter canw on for trial on J a n u a r y 19, 
1988, and for further hearing on April 11, 1088, b e f o r e the 
H o n o r a b l e D e n n i s L. D r a n o y . The P l a i n t i f f was pie sent and 
r e p r e s e n t e d by Rol a n d Uresk and M a c h e l l e F i t z g e r a l d . D e f e n d a n t 
was present and r e p r e s e n t e d by Dixon H i n d l e y . Both p l a i n t i f f and 
de f e n d a n t were called and did testify and w i t n e s s e s were called 
j and did t e s t i f y . 
The court h a v i n g s e p a r a t e l y made; and entered in F i n d i n g s of 
Fact and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law, does hereby ORDER, A D J U D G E AND 
D E C R E E : 
P^r»n-rH . 1 fiO 
I 
I 
1. P l a i n t i f f is h e r e b y g r a n t e d a d e c r e e of d i v o r c e from i 
[the D e f e n d a n t , on the g r o u n d s of mental c r u e l t y , to b e c o m e final J 
|j upon ent ry i n t he regi s t or of ac t i ons . | 
j 2. D e f e n d a n t ' s T e a m s t e r ' s P e n s i o n is a r e t i r e m e n t b e n e f i t . 
iiof which 5 3 % was earned d u r i n g the c o u r s e of the p a r t i e s 1 
[marriage. P l a i n t i f f is e n t i t l e d to o n e - h a l f of the p e n s i o n i 
earned d u r i n g the m a r r i a g e or 26.5 of that p e n s i o n . If d i r e c t 
ipayment of 20.5°o of the r e t i r e m e n t can be made to P l a i n t i f f by 
the T e a m s t e r ' s , D e f e n d a n t may elect to do so. O t h e r w i s e , to 
avoid the long lasting financial e n t a n g l e m e n t of the p a r t i e s , 
d e f e n d a n t will cash-out P l a i n t i f f ' s share of the r e t i r e m e n t | 
fund . 
3. Based on the p a r t i e s ' r e s p e c t i v e i n c o m e s , D e f e n d a n t 
! will pay P l a i n t i f f $ 2 0 0 . 0 0 per month as a l i m o n y . I 
4. D e f e n d a n t will m a i n t a i n P l a i n t i f f as a b e n e f i c i a r y on an 
insurance p o l i c y on his life of $ 5 , 0 0 0 , as further a l i m o n y . 
j 5. D e f e n d a n t will ass time and pay all o b l i g a t i o n s of the 
11 I 
| j parties i n c u r r e d p r i o r to their s e p a r a t i o n , and hold P l a i n t i f f 
li . " 
h f r e e and h a r m l e s s t h e r e f r o m . W i t h o u t such debt a s s u m p t i o n by 
jl D e f e n d a n t , P l a i n t i f f would be unable to support h e r s e l f . | 
II ' 
6. P l a i n t i f f is awarded the frame h o m e , g a r a g e , and the 
(real p r o p e r t y with a houmlry line drawn on the West side of the 
j 
(garage, to w i t h i n 1 f> feet of the horse barn, then east to the 
p r o p n r l y ]ino. I 
, R e c o r d , 161 
i 7. Defendant is awarded the trailer home, and improvements 
i 
•located on the remainder of the 1.5 acres, excluding the property 
'awarded to P l a i n t i f f . 
j 8. The parties will share equally the cost of surveying the 
boundary and erreeting a fence along that boundry. 
i 
9. Plaintiff is awarded the property described in schedule 
"A" and her personal p o s s e s s i o n s . 
10. Defendant, is awarded the property described in schdule 
" B" and his p e r s o n a 1 property. 
11. The remainder of the propert y ,. n.ot specifically divided 
by this court will be divided in half by the parties, with the 
exception of their personal b e l o n g i n g s , gifts, etc. Each party 
will have a couch, chairs, beds, etc., as far as p o s s i b l e . 
Defendant will receive the furniture which belonged to his father 
as part of his o n e - h a l f . If the parties cannot reach an 
jj agreement on the division of the personal property, Defendant 
will divide the property into two equal "lots and Plaintiff will 
chose which lot. she; should he awarded. 
12. The parties will move (switch homes) on the weekend of 
April 2 2 - 2 4 , 6:00 p.m. Friday to 6:00 p.m. Sunday. 
13. All personal papers of the parties will be delivered to 
their possession by 6:00 p.m. Sunday, April 24th. 
11. All pes ess ions of Mr. Mack's which are in the frame 
house will remain in D e f e n d a n t ' s possession until reclaimed by 
Mr. Mack, except for the; wood stove, which will remain in the 
Record, 162 
frame house until reclaimed by Mr. Mack. 
15. The major a p p l i a n c e s will stay in the home in which 
they are currently located. 
16. Any water s h a r e ( s ) on' the real p r o p e r t y , and water well 
located behind the garage is divided equally between the p a r t i e s . 
The parties will share the costs a s s o c i a t e d with m a i n t a i n i n g the 
I we 11 e q u a l l y . Defendant is awarded an easement over P l a i n t i f f ' s 
i 
^property for the solo purpose of access to and use of is half of 
i 
ithe w e l l . 
17. Defendant is awarded $ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 of the money market 
fund, and P l a i n t i f f is awarded the balance thereof. 
18. Each party will assume and pay for their own a t t o r n e y ' s 
fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
19. The parties are p e r m a n e n t l y and mutually r e s t r a i n e d 
from h a r a s s i n g , a n n o y i n g , molestini1: or d i s t u r b i n g the t r a n q u i l i t y 
of the other, or the other's w e l l - b e i n g , where ever they may be 
located, w o r k i n g or staying. 
W H E R E F O R E , left judgment be entered a c c o r d i n g l y . 
DATED this ^ - 5 ^ day of A p r i l , 1908. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT: 
; ^ ^ ^ i? *u~'C'' 
Denni s L. Draney 
District Judge 
f 
Record, 163 
i 
SCHEDULE "A" 
1979 Continental Town Coupe 
1974 snowmobile 
Mare and foal (gift to plaintiff) 
Tack (saddles, bridles) and hay 
Television (one) 
Deep freezer (one) 
Wood 
Two fishing polos and two life jackets 
Wheelbarrow 
Lawn mower and electric trimmer 
Shovel, rake, ax, horses and sprinklers 
Nine rolls of chain link fence, 1/4 roll 
wire, 1/2 roll of hogwiro 
Motor home 
Garage 
3 
rb( 
15 
,000 
300 
450 
355 
24 0 
100 
3 0 
35 
60 
>d 
135 . 
000 . 
950. 
. 00 
. 00 
.00 
.00 
00 
00 
op 
00 
00 
00 
00 
00 
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SCHEDULE "B" 
ramp t ra i1e r 
(motor and parts) 
t ra i 1 er 
mo t oJ* home ) 
1986 Ford pickup 
1980 snowmob ile 
Three horses 
Tack (saddles, bridles) and 'hay 
Televis i on (one) 
Deep freezer (one) 
Log splitter 
Swather (1/3 interest) 
Tractor 
1907 15-foot Kit 
1976 blue Dodge 
5th wheel horse 
2-whee1 trailer 
WeJdar 
Pickup topper 
Generator (not in 
Daler (for parts) 
Guns 
Recliner 
Skil saw 
Hummingbird fisLfinder 
Karrson Heater 
2 motorcycles and toat goat 
Bounty Hunter metal detector 
Portable cassette radio 
Cassette tapes #1 Top County 
Soft ice cream machine 
Nine rolls chain link fence, 
wire, 2 roll of hotwire 
Trashpump 3 x 3 Model QT-30T 
Portable CB radios in truck, 
and old Dodge truck 
CB base radio and antenna 
$13 
DE-280 Outlaw 
" 1 Pop and case 
1 '4 roll of barbed 
s/n 30iT-1239 
moto,. home, boat, 
, 000. 00 
900. 00 
380.00 
355.00 
•10 0.00 
4 0 0.00 
,000.00 
300. 00 
350 0 0 
,500.00 
7 5.00 
J5D.DO 
100. 00 
150. 00 
200.00 
135.00 
310.00 
200.00 
100.00 
240.00 
150.00 
50.00 
125.00 
150 .00 
135.00 
400 . 00 
240.00 
,000.00 
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ROLAND URFSK (3 307 ) 
MACHELLE FITZGERALD (4037) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Zions Bank Building 
156 North 200 East 
Roosevelt, Utah 8 4 066 
(801) 722 4668 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WANDA LUC1 LE COFFER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
J O H N IE E D W A R D C O F F E R 
D e f e n d a n t . 
F I N D I N G S OF F A C T S a n d 
C O N C L U S I O N S OF LAW 
C i v i l N o . 8 7 - C V - 1 9 4 - D 
T h e a b o v e - e n L i 1 1 e d m a t t e r c a m e on for t r i a l on J a n u a r y 1 9 , 
i;1988, a nd for f u r t h e r h e a r i n g on A p r i l 1 1 , 1 9 8 8 , b e f o r e t h e 
!i 
H o n o r a b l e D e n n i s L. D r a n e y . T h e P l a i n t i f f w a s p r e s e n t a n d 
r e p r e s e n t e d by R o l a n d IJresk and M a c h e l l e F i t z g e r a l d . D e f e n d a n t 
w a s p r e s e n t a nd r e p r e s e n t e d by D i x o n H i n d l e y . B o t h P l a i n t i f f a n d 
D e f e n d a n t w e r e c a l l e d and d i d t e s t i f y a n d w i t n e s s e s w e r e c a l l e d 
iand d id t o s t i f y . |; 
NO W T H E R E F O R E , b a s e d u p o n the t e s t i m o n y b e f o r e t he c o u r t , 
'the f i l e a nd r e c o r d s h e r e i n , the C o u r t m a k e s and e n t e r s t h e 
! f o 1 1 ow i nj» : 
Record/ 152 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. For »more than three (3) months prior to the commencement 
of this action, the Plaintiff and Defendant were bona fide 
residents of Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each other on 
June 7, 1970, and since that time have J C C D husband and wife. 
3. During the last few years of tlie marriage, the Defendant 
has treated Plaintiff cruelly and has been unwilling to agree 
with the Plaintiff on many matters and has insisted on arguing 
with Plaintiff on many issues or matters, causing Plaintiff great 
mental anxiety and concern, making the continuation of this 
marriage impossible. 
4. There were no children t>orn as issue of this marriage 
5. Defendant receives Social Security in the amount of 
$507.00 en oh month. 
6. Defendant is receiving retirement benefits from the 
Teamster's in the amount of $650.00 per month, until July 1989, 
at which time the bcnfits will reduce to $350.00. 
7. Defendant is receiving his retirement benefit earlier 
than he otherwise would have done because of a disability. 
8. Fifty-three percent (53°«) of Defendant's Teamster 
pension was earned by Defendant during the course of his marriage 
to Plaintiff. 
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9. P l a i n t i f f has l i t t l e or no a b i l i t y to p r o d u c e an i n c o m e 
or s u p p o r t h e r s e l f in the w a y of i n v e s t m e n t s or j o b s k i l l s . 
P l a i n t i f f w a s w o r k i n g at the H a n n a b a r t w o d a y s a w e e k , a n d 
e a r n i n g $ 1 0 0 . 0 0 to $ 1 2 5 . 0 0 p e r m o n t h , w h i c h j o b s h e lost w h e n t h e 
bar c l o s e d in J a n u a r y , 1 9 8 8 . P l a i n t i f f h a s no o t h e r j o b 
p r o s p e c t s . 
1 0 . D u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of the m a r r i a g e , the p a r t i e s h a v e 
a c q u i r e d c e r t a i n real and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y w h i c h n e e d s to be 
d i v i d e d by t h i s act ion. 
1 1 . T h e p a r t i e s h a v e a c q u i r e d c e r t a i n d e b t s and o b l i g a t i o n s 
d u r i n g t h e i r m a r r i a g e . 
1 2 . T h e v a l u e s p l a c e d on the p r o p e r t y by M e r v B e t t s and K a y 
C l o w a r d w e r e f a i r v a l u e s for the p r o p e r t y o w n e d by the p a r t i e s . 
1 3 . T h e p a r t i e s a r e h a v i n g d i f f i c u l t y in a g r e e i n g w i t h e a c h 
o t h e r and c o o p e r a t i n g in c o m p l e t i n g t h i s d i v o r c e . 
H A S Ml) on the f o r e g o i n g F i n d i n g s of F a c t , the? c o u r t m a k e s a n d 
e n t e r s the f o l l o w i n g : 
C O N C L U S I O N S OF LAW 
1. T h e c o u r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r the p a r t i e s to t h i s 
a c t i o n . 
2. Plaintiff ought to be entitled to a decree; of divorce 
from the Defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty, to become 
final upon entry in the register of actions. 
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J 3. D e f e n d a n t ' s T e a m s t e r ' s Pension is a retirement benefit, 
of which 53°o was earned during the course of the p a r t i e s ' 
imarraige. Plaintiff ought to be entitled to one-half of the 
pension earned during the m a r r i a g e , which 2 6 . 5 ^ of the total 
ipension. If direct payment of 26.5?© of the retirement b e n e f i t s 
jean be made to Plaintiff by the T e a m s t e r ' s , Defendant may elect 
I to do so. 
4. Based on the p a r t i e s ' respective incomes, defendant 
(ought to pay Plaintiff $200.00 per month as alimony. 
5. Defendant ought to maintain an insurance policy on his 
Jlife in the amount of S 5 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 , naming Plaintiff as beneficiary 
as further alimony. 
6. Defendant ought to assume and pay ail obligations of the 
parties incurred prior to their separation, and hold P l a i n t i f f 
free and harmless therefrom. Without such debt assumption by 
Defendant, Plaintiff would be unable to support herself. 
I 7. Plaintiff ought to be awarded the frame home, worth 
$ 1 2 , 5 6 2 . 5 0 , and the real property with a boundry line drawn on 
the West side of the garage, to within 15 feet of the horse barn, 
then east to the property line, contained a p p r o x i m a t e l y .33 
acres, worth $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
8. Defendant ought to be awarded the trailer home, worth 
j$7,300.00 and improvements located on the remaining 1.5 acres, 
(worth $ 5 , 2 5 1 , 5 0 , excluding the property awarded to Plaintiff. 
i 
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9. The parties ought to share equally the cost of surveying 
the boundry and erecting a fence along the boundary between the 
property awarder to each of them. 
10. Plaintiff ought to be awarded the property described in 
schedule "A" and her personal p o s s e s s i o n s . 
11. Defendant is awarded the property described in schdule 
"B" and his personal property. 
12. The remainder of the property, not specifically divided 
by this court shou1d be divided in half by the parties, with the 
exception of the parties' personal belonging, gifts, etc. Each 
party ought to have a couch, chairs, beds, etc., as far as 
possi ble. Defendant ought to receive the furniture which 
belonged to his father as part of his one half. 
13. The parties ought to move (switch homes) on the weekend 
of April 22-24, 0:00 p.m. Friday to 6:00 p.m. Sunday. If the 
parties cannot roach an agreement on the division of the personal 
property, Defendant ought to divide the property into two equal 
lots and Plaintiff ought to chose which lot she should be 
!awarded. 
14. All personal papers of the parties ought to be 
delivered to their possession by 6:00 p.m. Sunday, April 24th. 
15. All posessions of Mr. Mack's which are in the frame 
house ought to remain in Defendant's possession until reclaimed 
by Mr. Mack, except for the wood stove, which ought to remain in 
1 he frame house until reclaimed by Mr. Mack. 
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16. The major a p p l i a n c e s ought to stay in the home in w h i c h 
they are c u r r e n t l y located. 
1 7 . A n y ' w a t e r share (s) on the real p r o p e r t y , and w a t e r well 
located b e h i n d the H a r a r e . o u g h t to be divi d e d equally b e t w e e n the 
p a r t i e s . The p a r t i e s ought to share the costs a s s o c i a t e d w i t h 
m a i n t a i n i n g the we J.I e q u a l l y . D e f e n d a n t ought to have an 
e a s e m e n t over P l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p e r t y for the sole p u r p o s e of a c c e s s 
to and use of is half of the w e l l . 
1 8 . D e f e n d a n t ought to be awar d e d $ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 of the mo n e y 
market fund, and P l a i n t i f f ought to be awarded the b a l a n c e 
t h e r e o f . 
19. Kach party ought to assume and pay for their own 
a t t o r n e y ' s fees and costs incurred in this m a t t e r 
20. The temporary restraining order entered In this 
action ought to be made permanent. 
WHEREFORE, let judgment be entered accordingly. 
DATED t h i s ^ J ^ f d a y o f A p r i l , 1 9 8 8 . 
BY ORDER OF THE C O U R T : 
< ^ * ^ ^ 
D e n n i s L. D r a n e y £ 
D i s 1 r i c t J u d g e 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WANDA LUCILE COFFER, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
JOHN E. COFFER, 
DEFENDANT. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
TRIAL 
CIVIL NO. 87-CV-194D 
BE IT REMEMBERED, THAT ON THE 19TH DAY OF JANUARY, 
1988, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 11:00 A.M., THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR TRIAL IN THE DISTRICT COURTROOM 
OF THE DUCHESNE CITY AND COUNTY BUILDING, DUCHESNE, UTAH; 
SAID CAUSE BEING HEARD BY THE HONORABLE DENNIS L. DRANEY, 
JUDGE IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF UTAH. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF; ROLAND URESK, ESQ. 
ZIONS BANK BUILDING 
156 NORTH 200 EAST 
ROOSEVELT, UTAH 84066 
FOR THE DEFENDANT DIXON D. HINDLEY, ESQ. 
D. ARON STANTON & ASSOCIATES 
255 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 101 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
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1 BY MR. HINDLEY; 
2 Q HAVE YOU HAD IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES IN YOUR 
3 MARRIAGE? 
4 A WELL, FOR THE LAST YEAR AND-A-HALF, YES. 
5 Q WHAT ARE THEY? 
6 A WELL, WE JUST BOTH SEEM TO GO IN THE OPPOSITE 
7 DIRECTION. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT'S MY FAULT OR HER FAULT, 
8 BUT WE JUST DON'T SLEEP TOGETHER. SHE QUIT WASHING MY-
9 CLOTHES, QUIT COOKING MY MEALS. 
10 Q OKAY. 
11 A THEN SHE FILED FALSE CHARGES ON ME AND HAD ME 
12 THROWN OUT OF THE HOUSE. 
13 MR. HINDLEY: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
14 THE COURT: YOU MAY STEP DOWN. ANY OTHER WITNESSES, 
15 MR. HINDLEY? 
16 MR. HINDLEY: I HAVE NO OTHER WITNESSES, YOUR 
17 I HONOR. 
18 THE COURT: I WOULD LIKE COUNSEL TO ADVISE THE 
19 COURT WHETHER IT MAKES A DIFFERENCE IN HOW THE PENSION IS 
20 DIVIDED, WHETHER IT'S DISABILITY OR RETIREMENT? WHAT DOES 
2V THE LAW SAY ABOUT THAT? 
22 MR. URESK: THE LAW SAYS IF IT IS DISABILITY IT'S 
23 NOT DIVIDEABLE. BUT I THINK THE FACTS INDICATE—WE HAVE 
24 SUBMITTED A TRIAL MEMORANDUM ON THAT. 
25 THE COURT: IT'S IN THE TRIAL MEMORANDUM? HAVE 
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1 Q (BY MR. HINDLEY) DID YOU RECEIVE A PENSION FROM 
2 THE TEAMSTER'S FUND? 
3 A YES, SIR. 
4 II Q WHAT'S THE NATURE OF YOUR PENSION? 
5 ]| A FROM A DISABILITY. 
6 II Q IT'S FROM A DISABILITY? HOW WERE YOU DISABLED? 
7 A FROM MY HEART AND HEART SURGERY AND FROM MY HANDS 
8 AND ARMS. 
9 Q WHEN DID YOU HAVE YOUR FIRST HEART ATTACK? 
10 A SOMETIME IN '80, I BELIEVE. 
11 Q AND THEN YOU HAD ANOTHER HEART ATTACK AFTERWARDS? 
12 A ABOUT SIX MONTHS LATER I HAD ANOTHER ONE. 
13 Q DID YOU HAVE HEART SURGERY" 
14 A THEN AFTER THAT I HAD OPEN HEART SURGERY AND 
15 BYPASSES PUT IN. 
16 Q WHAT'S THE DISABILITY TO YOUR HANDS? 
17 A WELL, I HAVE GOT WHAT IS KNOWN AS GOUT. THEY ARE 
18 JUST SLOWLY BUT SURELY CRIPPLING MY HANDS. I HAVE ALREADY 
19 HAD THEM BOTH OPERATED ON ONCE, AND I HAVE GOT TO HAVE MORE 
20 OPERATIONS ON THEM. 
21 Q WERE YOU ABLE TO WORK AFTER YOUR HEART ATTACK? 
22 A NO. I CAN'T PASS A PHYSICAL. 
23 Q YOU ARE TOTALLY DISABLED AND HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO 
24 TAKE THE DISABILITY? 
25 A I HAD NO OTHER CHOICE. 
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A YES. 
Q AND THEN AFTER YOU HAD A HEART ATTACK YOU HAD TO 
TURN-THAT IN FOR A DISABILITY PENSION, CORRECT? 
A YES. 
MR. HINDLEY: YOUR HONOR, MAY I APPROACH THE 
WITNESS? 
THE COURT: HAVE THEY BEEN MARKED? 
MR. HINDLEY: IF YOU WOULD MARK THOSE AS EXHIBITS, 
PLEASE, IF THE COURT DOESN'T OBJECT. 
MR. URESK: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO 
THE ADMISSION OF THESE DOCUMENTS, BASED ON FOUNDATION AND 
HEARSAY. 
THE COURT: HAVE THEM MARKED SO WE CAN IDENTIFY 
THEM. 
MR. HINDLEY: MAY I APPROACH THE WITNESS? 
THE COURT: YOU MAY. BUT SINCE WE KNOW THERE IS 
AN OBJECTION YOU MAY ASK HIM WHAT THEY ARE AND THEN PROCEED 
WITH ANY FOUNDATION. BUT HE MAY NOT TESTIFY AS TO THE 
CONTENTS OF THOSE UNTIL THEY ARE RECEIVED. 
Q (BY MR. HINDLEY) I SHOW YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED AS 
EXHIBIT 4. DO YOU KNOW WHAT THAT IS, MR. COFFER? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q WHAT IS IT? 
A C T H A T ' S MY SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CERTIFICATE 
SAYING THAT I'M— 
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Q WHEN DID YOU BEGIN PAYING INTO THE TEAMSTER'S 
PENSION FUND? 
A I CAN'T REMEMBER FOR SURE. I THINK BACK IN '58 
WHEN THEY FIRST STARTED INTRODUCING THE RETIREMENT PLAN INTO 
THE TEAMSTER'S UNION. I HAVE BEEN PAYING INTO IT EVER SINCE 
I HAVE BEEN IN. I HAVE BEEN IN ABOUT THIRTY SOME YEARS. 
Q DO YOU RECEIVE SOCIAL SECURITY? 
A YES. 
Q IS THAT A DISABILITY PAYMENT? 
A I RECEIVED THAT--I GOT AN EARLY SOCIAL SECURITY 
ON THE GROUNDS OF DISABILITY. ' 
Q OKAY. YOU WERE FORCED TO'RETIRE, YOU HAVE 
ABSOLUTELY NO OTHER WAY OF MAKING A LIVING; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A NO, SIR. 
Q . EXCEPT FOR THE MONEY THAT YOU EARN FROM YOUR 
PENSIONS? 
A NO, SIR. 
Q HOW MUCH DO YOU RECEIVE FROM THE TEAMSTER'S PENSION 
FUND PER MONTH? 
A I GUESS $650.00 RIGHT NOW, BUT JULY OF NEXT YEAR 
IT DROPS DOWN TO—I LOSE $300. I ONLY GET $350.00 STARTING 
NEXT JULY. 
THE COURT: THAT'S JULY 1988 OR— 
THE WITNESS: '89. 
Q (BY MR. HINDLEY) HOW MUCH DO YOU RECEIVE PER 
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A SINCE 1982, 
Q NOW, IS THIS A RETIREMENT? 
A YES, IT -IS. 
Q DO YOU RECALL OR TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE WHEN DID MR. 
COFFER START WORKING FOR THE TEAMSTERS AND USING THIS PLAN? 
A HE STARTED IN JUNE OF. 1960. 
Q AND HE WAS CONTRIBUTING TO THAT PLAN ALL THE WAY UP 
UNTIL HE STARTED COLLECTING UNDER THE RETIREMENT PLAN IN 
1982? 
A YES. 
Q MRS. COFFER, WHY IS IT THAT YOU WANT THIS DIVORCE? 
A THERE HAVE BEEN SO MANY CHANGES THAT I JUST—WHY 
LIVE WITH IT ANYMORE. HE HAD HEART ATTACKS AND I TOOK HIM 
TO THE HOSPITAL AND SAT WITH HIM. I HAVE GONE THROUGH OPEN 
v _ 
HEART_SURGERIES AND EVERYTHING. I DEVOTED MY WHOLE LIFE 
TO HIM, AND AFTER WE MOVED OUT TO KANNA HE STARTED DRINKING. 
AFTER WE RUN THE CAFE AND DUDE RANCH, AND HE STARTED 
RUNNING AROUND WITH A YOUNGER GROUP OF PEOPLE OUT THERE. 
ALL THEY DO IS PARTY AND DRINK AND CHASE AND RUN AND GO AND 
1 JUST CANNOT PUT UP WITH IT. HE DRINKS UNTIL HE PASSES OUT 
IN THE CHAIR, ON THE TABLE, OR.ON THE FLOOR. 
MR. HINDLEY 
THE WITNESS 
MR. HINDLEY 
OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. 
I CAN'T COPE WITH IT. 
THIS IS PREJUDICIAL. 
THE COURT: EXCUSE ME, MRS. COFFER. 
Record, 187 
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MENT. WHY DID MR. COFFER BEGIN TO DRAW HIS PENSION? 
A HE WAS FORCED TO RETIRE AFTER HIS OPEN HEART 
SURGERY. 
IAT CORRECT? 
Q OKAY. HE WAS DISABLED AND THEREFORE GIVEN A 
PENSION^ 
A YES. 
Q WELL, I WILL PROCEED WITH SOME DIRECT QUESTIONING, 
IF THERE IS NO OBJECTION AT THIS TIME. 
WHAT PROPERTY DID YOU BRING INTO THE MARRIAGE, MRS. 
COFFER? 
A I DIDN'T BRING ANYTHING INTO THE MARRIAGE. 
Q DID YOU HAVE CHILDREN FROM ANOTHER MARRIAGE AT THE 
TIME YOU MARRIED? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q AND THEY ARE NO LONGER MINORS? 
A NO. THEY ARE ALL OLDER AND MARRIED. 
Q DID JOHN PROVIDE AND CARE FOR THEM DURING YOUR 
MARRIAGE? 
A MOST OF THE TIME. THE FIRST YEAR OR TWO YEARS THAT 
WE WERE MARRIED HE MADE ME STAY ON WELFARE. 
Q HOW MUCH DID YOU CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCUMULATION OF 
PROPERTY THAT WAS ACCUMULATED DURING THE MARRIAGE? DID YOU 
WORK? 
A I WORKED WHEN WE WERE UP AT THE DUDE RANCH. OTHER 
THAN THAT HE WOULD NOT ALLOW ME TO WORK. WHEN HE CAME HOME 
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I HAD TO BE THERE. I WORKED ALL DURING MY PREVIOUS MARRIAGE. 
I WORKED UP UNTIL WE GOT MARRIED AND THEN HE REFUSED TO LET 
ME WORK UNTIL AFTER WE RETIRED AND MOVED OUT HERE AND THEN 
WE LEASED TO THE DUDE RANCH FOR TWO YEARS. 
Q SO YOU WORKED FOR A NUMBER Of YEARS BEFORE YOU WERE 
MARRIED? 
A BEFORE I WAS MARRIED. 
Q WHAT TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT DID YOU HAVE AT THAT TIME? 
A I HAVE WORKED IN A BANK. I WORKED FOR A .TRUCKING 
COMPANY. 
Q DOING WHAT? WHAT WERE YOUR JOB TITLES? 
A IN THE BANK I WAS A BOOKKEEPER, AND IN THE TRUCKING 
BUSINESS I WAS A SECRETARY. 
Q YOU HAVE ACCOUNTING SKILLS AND BOOKKEEPING SKILLS 
AND SECRETARIAL SKILLS? 
A WELL, YEARS AGO, YES. NOT WITH THE NEW COMPUTERS 
AND THAT TYPE OF THING. 
Q WHAT WERE YOU PAID AT THAT TIME, DO YOU RECALL? 
A I THINK THE MOST I WAS EVER PAID ON A BANKING JOB 
WAS $220.00 A MONTH. FOR THE TRUCKING COMPANY I GOT ABOUT 
$22-00 A WEEK. 
Q THIS WAS IN WHAT YEAR? 
A 1955-56 THROUGH f60. ALONG IN THERE. 
Q ALL RIGHT. WERE YOU EVER AN OFFICE MANAGER? 
A NO. 
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1 Q WERE YOU A TRUCK DISPATCHER? 
2 A I DID OCCASIONALLY. MY EX-HUSBAND WAS A TERMINAL 
3 MANAGER, AND WHEN HE WASN'T THERE I HAD TO DISPATCH THE 
4 TRUCKS. 
5 Q WHAT OTHER TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT HAVE YOU HAD? 
6 A I WORKED FOR AMERICAN COMPRESSOR AND ROCK DRILL 
7 COMPANY, JUST AS A SECRETARY ANSWERING THE PHONE FOR A SHORT 
8 PERIOD OF TIME. 
9 Q WHAT DID YOU DO AT THE HANNA DUDE RANCH? 
10 A AT THE DUDE RANCH? 
11 Q YES. 
12 A WE HAD A CAFE AND A BAR AND CABINS TO RENT OUT, AND 
13 I WORKED IN THE CAFE. I WORKED IN THE BAR. EIGHTEEN, TWENTY 
14 HOURS A DAY. , 
15 Q SOMETHING LIKE A MANAGER/OWNER "pR SOMETHING? 
16 A YES. WE LEASED THE CAFE OR LEASED THE RANCH. 
17 Q YOU DO HAVE AN AUTOMOBILE, DON'T YOU? 
18 A YES, I DO. 
19 Q DO YOU HAVE ANY DIPLOMAS? DO YOU HAVE A HIGH 
20 SCHOOL DIPLOMA? — — ~_ 
21 A, I HAVE A HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA, J?ES. 
22 Q DID YOU OBTAIN ANY EDUCATION BEYOND THAT? 
23 A NO. I DIDN'T. 
24 Q IN YOUR CURRENT LIVING SITUATION YOU LIVE ALONE? 
25 A YES. 
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Q OKAY. SINCE YOU HAVE BEEN SEPARATED FROM MR. 
COFFER—WELL, HOW ARE YOU EMPLOYED? 
A I WORK OCCASIONALLY. I WORK AT THE HANNA BAR AND 
CAFE. THEY WERE HAVING ME WORK TWO AND THREE DAYS A WEEK, 
AND NOW THEY HAVE CLOSED DOWN. I USED TO WORK SUNDAYS AND 
MONDAYS. NOW THEIR BUSINESS HAS DROPPED OFF SO MUCH THEY 
ARE CLOSED MONDAYS, TUESDAYS AND WEDNESDAYS. THIS PAST 
WEEK I WORKED FRIDAY, SATURDAY AND SUNDAY BECAUSE THEY WERE 
DOWN IN BED WITH THE FLU. THE PREVIOUS WEEK I HAD 'THE FLU 
AND THE BAR WAS CLOSED. I ONLY WORK A FEW HOURS A WEEK. 
Q ABOUT HOW MANY HOURS DO YOU AVERAGE A WEEK ON A 
NORMAL WEEK? 
A PROBABLY TWENTY TO THIRTY. ALSO I GET PAID $2.00 
AN HOUR, PLUS WHATEVER TIPS WE MAKE, WHICH OUT THERE NOBODY 
KNOWS WHAT A TIP IS. IT'S JUST THE OUTSIDERS WHO COME IN. 
AND I HAVEN'T BEEN PAID. THEY PAID ME IN NOVEMBER AND THEY 
PAID ME A LITTLE BIT IN DECEMBER AND THEY HAVE NOT PAID ME TO 
DATE NOW BECAUSE THEY HAVEN'T HAD THE BUSINESS COMING IN TO 
KEEP UP WITH THEIR BILLS. 
Q SO FOR THE MONTH OF JANUARY YOU HAVEN'T BEEN PAID 
AS OF YET? • • 
A NO. AND PART OF NOVEMBER, DECEMBER, AND THE REST 
OF JANUARY. 
Q ABOUT HOW MUCH DO YOU BRING IN EACH WEEK, TIPS AND 
REGULAR SALARY? 
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1 Q I HAVE IN MY FILE TWO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FROM 
2 YOU, ONE OF WHICH SHOWS A TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSE OF $775.00, 
3 AND ANOTHER WHICH SHOWS A TOTAL EXPENSE OF $1,045.. THEY ARE 
4 BOTH DATED THE SAME DAY AND BOTH SIGNED BY BOTH YOU AND YOUR 
5 COUNSEL, AND I'M CONFUSED AS TO WHICH IS THE MORE ACCURATE. 
6 A THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN MY INSURANCE, AND THEN 
7 THAT WAS WHEN MY TEETH WERE GOING BAD. 
8 II Q THESE ARE BOTH DATED THE 21ST OF OCTOBER. 
9 THE COURT: THE COURT HAS ONE. IT SHOWS THE TOTAL 
10 MONTHLY EXPENSE OF $1,045.00, AND INCOME OF $100.00 TO $125.00 
11 | PER MONTH. APPARENTLY THAT'S THE ONE UPON WHICH THEY ARE 
12 RELYING. 
13 Q (BY MR. HINDLEY) MRS. COFFER, IF YOU DON'T MIND 
14 AT THIS TIME I W I L L — L E T ME ASK YOU ABOUT THE PENSION. DID 
15 YOU KNOW MR. COFFER IN 1960? 
16 A NO. I DIDN'T. 
17 Q HOW DID YOU KNOW THAT HE BEGAN PAYING INTO HIS 
18 PENSION FUND AT THAT TIME? 
19 A BECAUSE THROUGH BEING MARRIED TO HIM. HE SAID HE 
20 STARTED PAYING INTO IT IN '60. THAT'S WHEN HE MOVED TO 
21 SALT LAKE AND WENT TO WORK; FOR GARRETT FREIGHTLINES. 
22 Q AND YOU HAVE NOT LOOKED FOR EMPLOYMENT AT THIS 
23 POINT; IS THAT CORRECT? 
24 A NO. THERE IS NOTHING OUT THERE IN THAT AREA. 
25 Q WELL, YOU DID CHARACTERIZE THE PENSION AS RETIRE-
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